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Abstract
A group of n individuals A1, . . . An who do not trust each other and
are located far away from each other, want to select a leader. This is
the leader election problem, a natural extension of the coin flipping
problem to n players. We want a protocol which will guarantee that
an honest player will have at least 1n −  chance of winning
(∀ > 0), regardless of what the other players do (weather they are
honest, cheating alone or in groups). It is known to be impossible
classically. This work gives a simple algorithm that does it, based
on the weak coin flipping protocol with arbitrarily small bias derived
by Mochon [Moc00] in 2007, and recently published and simplified in
[ACG+16]. A protocol with linear number of coin flipping rounds is
quite simple to achieve; We further provide an improvement to log-
arithmic number of coin flipping rounds. This is a much improved
journal version of a preprint posted in 2009; The first protocol with
linear number of rounds, was achieved independently also by [NJ10]
around the same time.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we present a quantum protocol for the Leader election problem
- a natural extension of coin flipping; in fact, our protocol uses as a black
box a quantum solution to the coin flipping protocol ([Moc00, ACG+16]).
Thus, let us first review the coin flipping problem and what is known
about it.
1.1 The coin flipping problem
A standard coin flipping is a game in which two parties, Alice and Bob, wish
to flip a coin from a distance. The two parties do not trust each other, and
would each like to win with probability of at least 0.5. A natural problem
is to find good protocols - a protocol in which a player could not cheat and
force the outcome of the game to his benefit.
There are two types of coin flipping - strong and weak. In strong coin
flipping, each party might want to bias the outcome to any result, and the
protocol has to protect against any such cheating. In weak coin flipping each
party has a favorite outcome, and so the protocol has to protect only against
cheating in that direction.
We denote the winning probability of Alice to win a weak coin flipping
when both players are honest as PA, and similarly PB for Bob. The maximum
winning probability of a cheating Alice (i.e. when she acts according to her
optimal strategy, while Bob is honest) is denoted by P ∗A, and similarly P ∗B
for a cheating Bob.
Let  = max(P ∗A, P ∗B)− 12 be the bias of the protocol. The bias actually tells
us how good the protocol is. The smaller the bias is, the better the protocol
is.
It is well known that without computational assumptions, even weak
coin flipping is impossible to achieve in the classical world (see [Cle87]. Note
that impossibility of weak coin flipping implies impossibility of strong coin
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flipping). That is, one of the players can always win with probability 1. In
the quantum setting, the problem is far more interesting.
1.2 Quantum coin flipping
Quantum strong coin flipping protocols with large but still non-trivial biases
were first discovered by [ATSVY00] (with bias  < 0.4143). Kitaev then
proved (see for example in [ABDR03]) that in strong coin flipping, every
protocol must satisfy P ∗0 · P ∗1 ≥ 12 , hence  ≥
√
2−1
2
. This result raised the
question of whether weak coin flipping with arbitrarily small bias is possible.
Protocols were found with smaller and smaller biases ([ABDR03] showed
strong CF with bias 1
4
, [Moc04] showed weak CF with bias 0.192), until
Mochon showed in his unpublished breakthrough paper [Moc00] that there
are families of weak coin flipping protocols whose bias converges to zero. This
result was simplified in [ACG+16]. It is also known that even in the quantum
world, a perfect protocol (i.e.  = 0) is not possible ([MSCK99]).
1.3 The leader election problem
The leader election problem is the natural generalization of the weak coin
flipping, to n players.
The bias of the problem, is defined to be the minimal  such that, every
honest player has a winning probability of at least 1
n
−  (we do not have any
limitation on the number of cheating players). We will denote leader election
with bias  by LE.
As mentioned before, it is classically impossible to do a weak coin flip-
ping with a bias < 0.5 without assumptions about the computation power
([Cle87]). The same argument will show that it is also impossible to solve
the leader election problem in the classical setting, in the sense that there
will always be a player who can guarantee getting elected.
Since leader election is not possible in the general sense, people tried to use
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assumptions and conditions in order to make it possible. For example, [Fei00]
presents a classical leader election protocol (given that a player can flip a coin
by herself) such that given (1+δ)n
2
honest players, the player whom the proto-
col chooses is one of the honest players, with probability Ω(δ1.65). In addition
there is a proof that every classical protocol has a success (electing an honest
leader) probability of O(δ1−), for every  > 0. Note that there are limitation
on the number of cheaters.
Another variant is a protocol that chooses a processor randomly among n
possibilities (In this case, there are no cheaters, the players are anonymous
and run the same protocol, and we want a protocol with minimal running
time / communication complexity, or one that works without knowing the
number of processors. See [TKM07] for a quantum exact algorithm that
solves this, but requires knowing a bound on n). This type is sometimes
called fair leader election problem (because there are no cheaters).
In this paper we investigate the version of Leader election with cheaters,
defined in the beginning of this subsection. We will refer to this type simply
as the leader election problem.
Until a short time before the first version of this result was posted, there
was no quantum result regarding this Leader election problem as it was
defined here. We note however that there were some results on other types,
such as [ABDR03] which considered our leader election problem, but allow
penalty for cheaters that got caught (which is obviously a weaker version of
the problem), and also the mentioned [TKM07] for the fair leader election
problem.
1.4 Our result
If n is a power of 2, then a trivial solution exists, given a good weak coin
flip protocol. We can do a knock-out tournament (the loser quits) of weak
coin flipping, with log(n) rounds. In each round, all eligible players divide
into pairs, and play weak coin flip, where the loser gets eliminated from the
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tournament. The winner of the tournament will be elected as the leader.
Theorem 1. If n = 2k for some k ∈ N, then for every  > 0 there exists
a leader election protocol LE , in which if all players are honest, then each
has a winning probability of 1
n
, otherwise any honest player has a winning
probability > 1
n
− . With running time of O (N log n), and O (log n) rounds
of balanced weak coin flipping, where N is the number of rounds in a weak
balanced coin flipping protocol P of bias .
Proof. We will have full knock-out tournament of balanced weak coin flipping
P between the players, and the winner of the tournament will be declared
as the leader.
It is obvious that if all players are honest, then each player has a winning
probability of 1
n
=
(
1
2
)k.
The only thing left to show is that each honest player has a winning proba-
bility of at least 1
n
− .
This is true because we have log n rounds, and in each round an honest
player has a winning probability of at least 1
2
− , hence in total the winning
probability is at least(
1
2
− 
)logn
=
(
1− 2
2
)k
≥ 1− 2k
2k
=
1
n
− 2 log n
n
≥ 1
n
− 
where we used the Bernoulli inequality (1 + x)n ≥ 1 + nx which is true for
any
x ≥ −1 , n ∈ N, and in our case, ∀  ≤ 1
2
(which is obviously satisfied).
We prove a generalization for that inequality in lemma 7.
A problem arises when n is not a power of 2, then this is not possible, and
putting in a dummy player involves some difficulties. If the cheaters could
control the dummy player, they would increase their winning probability.
This paper addresses this question.
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Our first solution (which was also discovered in [NJ10], independently) is
to let A1 play against A2 and then the winner of that will play A3 and so
on, as in a tournament, except we use unbalanced weak coin flips. These are
known to be possible using the balanced weak coin flipping protocol (see in
[CK09]) but are more expensive in terms of time.
As mentioned, in [Moc00] Mochon showed the existence of a weak coin
flipping protocol with an arbitrarily small bias of at most . Let us denote
this protocol by P throughout this paper. This protocol assumes that if
both players are honest, then each player has 1
2
chance of winning (this is
called a balanced coin flipping protocol). We denote by N the running time
of a balanced coin flipping protocol P with bias , which is the same as the
number of rounds in that protocol.
It is also possible to build an unbalanced weak coin flipping with an arbitrarily
small bias , in which if both players are honest, then one honest player will
have q winning probability, and the other player will have 1 − q winning
probability. If only the first player is honest, his winning probability is at
least q−  (similarly 1− q−  for the second player, in case he is honest). We
will denote this protocol as Pq,. In [CK09] it was shown that such protocols
can be approximated using repetition of P, with a total of O
(
N · log 1
)
rounds (See corollary 5 for more details).
The leader will be the winner of the final (n− 1)th step. We arrive at the
following theorem:
Theorem 2. For every  > 0, there exists a quantum leader election protocol
LE, in which any honest player has a winning probability ≥ 1n − , with
running time of O
(
n · log(n

) ·N 
4n
)
, and O (n) rounds of coin flipping.
This theorem will be proven is section 2, but as mentioned before, this
simple solution is inefficient. It uses a linear number of coin flipping rounds:
n− 1 of them.
Therefore we searched and found a better solution, that reduces the number
of coin flipping rounds, and yields the following theorem:
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Theorem 3. For every  > 0, there exists a leader election protocol LE, in
which any honest player has a winning probability ≥ 1
n
−, with running time
of O
(
N 
4
log n log 1

)
, and O (log n) rounds of coin flipping.
This theorem provides improvement of parameters with respect to theo-
rem 2. The number of coin flipping rounds improves from O (n) to O (log n),
and the number of total unbalanced coin flipping from O (n) to O (log n) as
well. So the running time complexity (players can play in parallel which does
not increase the time complexity - we only count the longest coin flipping in
each round. See 2.1 for exact definition) reduces from Θ
(
n · log(n

) ·N 
4n
)
to
O
(
N 
4
· log n · log 1

)
in the worst case, and in the best case, where n = 2k,
our protocol runs at O (log n ·N), achieving the optimal complexity as that
of Theorem 1.
The actual complexity improvement depends on N. As of today, we only
know a lower bound of O
(
log log 1

)
due to [ABDR03]. In this scenario, as-
suming  = Θ
(
1
n
)
we get time complexity of O
(
log2 n · log log n) instead of
O
(
n · log2 n), which is exponentially better.
The only upper bound known is 1

O( 1 ) due to [ACG+16]. Even if we only
use N = O
(
2
1

)
, then assuming  = Θ
(
1
n
)
we get time complexity of
O (2n · log n · log log n) instead of O
(
2n
2 · n log n
)
, which is again exponen-
tially better.
However if N is linear in 1 , then assuming  = Θ
(
1
n
)
we get time complexity
O
(
n log2 n
)
instead of O (n3 log n).
Still in all cases theorem 3 provides a significant improvement in parameters.
To prove theorem 3, we use a knock-out tournament of weak coin flipping,
in which the loser quits and the winner continues to the next round. Since n
(the number of players) is not necessarily a power of 2, then one must adjust
it.
Our protocol is fairly simple and uses log n rounds of unbalanced weak
protocols Pq′i, 2 as will be defined later, in section 3, where we will prove
Theorem 3 (at most one at each round). This limitation is important, be-
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cause at the moment we only know how to implement an unbalanced flip
using a repetition of balanced coin flip, which influences the total message
complexity.
If it were possible to improve the complexity of unbalanced coin flip, to
that of a balanced coin flip (this is an open problem), then one can improve
the complexity of the suggested leader election protocol to O (N log n). It is
possible that this can also be achieved by finding an appropriate families of
time independent point games (see [Moc00, ACG+16]) to derive more efficient
protocols, but this has never been done before and will not be done in this
paper.
1.5 Related work
This work was first posted in 2009. This paper is the journal version of that
preprint, which is much improved.
A related work was published [NJ10] at the same time as the preprint.
They refer to the leader election problem as weak dice rolling, and they
use the same protocol as we did (independently) in 2.4, proving theorem 2.
(However, they assume there exists Pq, for every q ∈ [0, 1], which is not
known to be true, but only an approximation to such). As mentioned before,
our work improves that result significantly.
[NJ10] also study the leader election problem in the strong scenario, under
the name of strong dice rolling. Namely they consider the problem of n ≥ 2
remote parties, having to decide on a number between 1 and N ≥ 3, in which
the parties want to avoid bias in any direction. They generalize Kitaev’s
bound (see [ABDR03]) to apply to n parties N sided strong dice-rolling. This
was done by noting that strong dice rolling can always be used to implement
strong imbalanced coin flipping. Note that this rules out Leader election in
the strong version for n = N .
[NJ10] also extend the strong optimal coin flipping protocol in [CK09] and
provide a family of strong dice rolling protocols which matches this bound,
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for the case of the number of parties being n = 2 ·M and the number of
outcomes to be N = TM for any M,T ∈ N.
1.6 Organization of the paper:
Section 2 gives formal definitions and proves Theorem 2.
Section 3 proves Theorem 3.
Section 4 is open questions.
In the Appendix, we gives formal definition of weak coin flipping.
2 Leader election protocol
We start by some standard definitions.
2.1 Definitions and requirements
By a weak coin flipping protocol we mean that Alice wins if the outcome is
0, and Bob wins if it is 1.
A weak coin flipping protocol with PA = q, PB = 1 − q, bias  will be
denoted by Pq,.
A leader election protocol with n parties A1, . . . , An has an outcome
t ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We will denote by Pi the probability that the outcome is
t = i.
We assume that each player has its own private space, untouchable by
other players, a message spaceM which is common to all (M can include a
space for the identification of the sender and receiver).
We use the existence of a weak coin flipping protocol with bias at most 
for every  > 0 . This fact was proved in [Moc00] for PA = PB = 12 and we
will denote it as P and by N the number of its rounds (we define a round
shortly). There is a proof that there is an approximation to such a protocol
for every PA, PB (s.t. PA + PB = 1) in [CK09] by repetitions of P, with
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O
(
log 1

·N
)
rounds. (It seems possible to generalize the weak coin flipping
protocol [9,2] directly to unbalanced coin flipping with any PA + PB = 1,
without this log n increase in complexity, but this wasn’t done yet.) Recall
that we denoted such unbalanced protocol with PA = q and bias  by Pq,.
We will denote the approximate protocol by Pq′, 
2
See corollary 5 for details.
Remark. A round in a coin flipping protocol, consists of two steps: First
where Alice does something on her space A⊗M and sends Bob the message
space. Second when Bob receives the message, does something on his space
M⊗B, and sends Alice a reply. Hence, the running time of a coin flipping
protocol, is the number of its rounds (see section 4 for more details).
A coin flipping round in our leader election protocol, is essentially a coin
flipping, performed in parallel, between the pairs of players who are still
eligible to be elected.
In our analogy to a knock-out tournament, a coin flipping round corresponds
to a round in that tournament.
The running time of a coin flipping round is thus the running time of a
single coin flipping (which is the number of communication rounds of the
two players). Since different coin flipping in the same round might take
different times, we consider the worst coin flipping time of each round.
Hence the running time of our leader election protocol, will be the sum of the
running times of its coin flipping rounds. It can be bounded by the number
of coin flipping rounds times the running time of the worst coin flipping (in
all the tournament).
Proposition 4. [CK09] Let P be a balanced weak coin flipping protocol with
bias  and N rounds.
Then ∀q ∈ [0, 1] and ∀k ∈ N, there exists an unbalanced weak coin flipping
protocol Pq′,δ with k ·N rounds, such that | q′ − q |≤ 2−k and δ = 2.
Assume we are interested in a protocol with PA = q , PB = 1−q for some
q.
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Let k = 1 +
⌈
log 1

⌉
. Then according to the proposition w.r.t P 
4
, there exist
Pq′,δ with O
(
log 1

·N 
4
)
rounds, such that | q′ − q |≤ 
2
and δ = 2 · 
4
= 
2
.
Hence an honest first player has a winning probability of at least
q′ − δ ≥ q − 
2
− δ = q − 2δ.
An honest second player has a winning probability of at least
1− q′ − δ ≥ 1− q − 
2
− δ = 1− q − 2δ.
Note that this protocol ensures that when both players are honest, PA = q′,
hence |PA − q| ≤ 2 .
Similarly |PB − (1− q)| ≤ 2 , PA + PB = 1.
This proves:
Corollary 5. For Every q 6= 1
2
, δ > 0 there exists a weak coin flipping
protocol Pq′,δ s.t. |q′ − q| ≤ δ with O
(
N δ
2
· log 1
δ
)
rounds.
When all players are honest, then PA = q′ is guaranteed to satisfy
|PA − q| ≤ δ , PB = 1− q′ , |PB − (1− q)| ≤ δ.
The winning probability is at least q′ − δ ≥ q − 2δ for an honest A player,
and 1− q − 2δ for an honest B player.
The proof of theorem 2 is basically a simple combinatorial manipulation
of how to combine balanced coin flips to achieve the correct probability of
winning. Corollary 5 enables to calculate the complexity due to using bal-
anced coin flips.
There is one delicate point: we have to make sure that the cheaters can
not increase their winning probability in a specific coin flip, by losing previous
coin flip (say by creating entanglements). This will be discussed in subsection
2.2.
We will first present the simpler case of three parties, to show the basic
idea. The general case is a natural generalization of this, and we will analyze
it in details. Nevertheless the three party case captures the basic idea of the
problem in its simple version, namely the proof of Theorem 2.
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2.2 Group of cheaters
When we analyze coin flipping between two players, we assume one of them
is honest and analyze the scenario that the other player is cheating and we
then bound his winning probability. In multiparty protocol, such as the
leader election, another possibility might occur. A group of cheating players
Ai ∈ C might try to increase their winning probability as a team.
For example, maybe it is possible that A2, A3, A4 are a cheating team. They
know that in the first round A1 plays A2, and in the second round the winner
of that encounter will play A3 or A4. Maybe they can create some cheating
strategy that will cause A2, A3 to lose, but will increase significantly the
winning chances of A4 in the second round?
This might sound far fetched, but as [GS] show, it is a possible scenario in
parallel coin flipping; it is the analogy of quantum hedging (see [MW12]).
However, this is not possible to do in a sequential setting as ours. The point
is that an honest player Aj plays one coin flipping round at a time, and the
next coin flipping protocol he participates in starts after the previous one
ends. In this setting, the following claim holds:
Claim 6. if Aj is honest, and is playing coin flipping protocols sequentially,
where the ith protocol is Pq′i,i , against whoever may be, then her chance of
winning the ith round, even conditioned on whatever happened in previous
rounds with other players, is at least q′i − i.
Proof. Since Aj is honest, she starts her ith round with a clean ancilla register.
Assume in the worst case that all other players conspire against her together.
Suppose they can collude to make her winning probability strictly smaller
than q′i− i. Then a cheater playing against Aj a single coin flipping protocol
can also do this, by simulating what they have done in previous rounds to
prepare the initial state of the protocol, and then simulating what they do in
the current round. This is in contradiction to the fact that no matter what
a cheating player does, Aj has at least q′i − i probability to win against her
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opponent when playing a single round of a coin flipping protocol Pq′i,i .
In our protocols, every round each eligible player plays a weak coin flip-
ping Pq,. This protocol guarantees the honest player a winning probability
of q − .
2.3 Three parties: A,B,C
Alice, Bob and Charlie want to select a leader.
Let  > 0. We will show a leader election protocol LE, such that an
honest party has a winning probability of at least 1
3
− .
Let ′ = 
2
.
2.3.1 Protocol
1. Alice plays Bob P′ (balanced coin flip with bias 2).
2. The winner plays Charlie P 2
3
′
,′ , where by this we mean Pq′,′ such that∣∣q′ − 2
3
∣∣ ≤ 
2
(the existence of this protocol is given by corollary 5).
3. The winner of that flip is declared as the leader.
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2.3.2 Analysis
• If all players are honest, then A (same for B) has at least
1
2
· q′ ≥ 1
2
· (2
3
− 
2
)
= 1
3
− 
4
> 1
3
−  chance of winning. (1
2
the chance
of winning against B, and q′ to then win against C).
C has just one game, so he obviously has at least 1− q′ ≥ 1
3
− 
2
> 1
3
− 
chance of winning.
• If A is honest, we can think of it as if A is the only honest player. Then
the calculation is almost the same from her point of view: In the first
game she has 1
2
−′ winning probability, and in the second (conditioned
that she had won the first round) she has at least
q′− ′ ≥ 2
3
− ′− ′ = 2
3
−  winning probability. So in the total she has
(1
2
− 
2
)(2
3
− ) ≥ 1
3
− 5
6
+ 
2
2
> 1
3
− 5
6
 > 1
3
− .
• If B is honest then the calculation is the same, just replace A with B
and vice versa.
• If C is honest - again he has only one flip, so he has at least
1− q′ − ′ ≥ 1− 2
3
− ′ − ′ = 1
3
−  chance of winning.
• Number of coin flips = 2.
• First coin flip is P′ , hence involves N 
2
rounds.
Second coin flip is P 2
3
′
,′ , and by corollary 5, it involves O
(
N 
4
log 1

)
rounds, hence the total running time is O
(
N 
4
log 1

)
.
2.4 Simple solution
In the general case we have n parties A1, . . . , An.
Let  > 0. We will show a leader election protocol, such that an honest
player has a winning probability of at least 1
n
− .
Let ′ = 
2n
.
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2.4.1 Protocol:
1. Let W1 = A1.
2. For i = 2 to n
(a) Wi−1 plays Ai a P i−1
i
′
,′ unbalanced weak coin flipping protocol.
Namely, Pq′,′ such that
∣∣q′ − ( i−1
i
)∣∣ ≤ ′.
Except when i = 2, then the protocol is simply P′ .
(b) Wi is the winner.
3. Wn is declared as the leader.
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2.4.2 Analysis
Note that player j enters the game in the jth stage (i.e. when i = j on #2a
in the protocol), when he plays coin flip with winning probability at least
1− q′− ′ ≥ 1− i−1
i
− 2′ ≥ 1
i
− 2′ (The only exception in the protocol is A1
that also plays for the first time when i = 2, but then also P1 =12 , so it has
the same path as A2).
Lemma 7. If ∀i 0 ≤ ai ≤ 1, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1n
∏n
i=1 ai , then
n∏
i=1
(ai − x) ≥
(
n∏
i=1
ai
)
− nx
Proof. By induction on n.
If n = 2 then (a− x) (b− x) = ab− x (a+ b) + x2 ≥ ab− 2x.
Assume correctness for n and prove for n+ 1:∏n+1
i=1 (ai − x) = (
∏n
i=1 (ai − x)) (an+1 − x) ≥ ((
∏n
i=1 ai)− nx) (an+1 − x) =
because every multiplicand is non-negative (from our assumptions on x)
=
(∏n+1
i=1 ai
)− x (n · an+1 +∏ni=1 ai) + nx2 ≥ (∏n+1i=1 ai)− x (n+ 1)
• If Ai is honest (i ≥ 2), then his winning probability is at least:(
1
i
− 2′) · ( i
i+1
− 2′) · ( i+1
i+2
− 2′) · . . . · (n−2
n−1 − 2′
) · (n−1
n
− 2′)
≥ 1
n
− (n− i+ 1) 2′ ≥ 1
n
−  by lemma 7, with
x = 2′ = 
n
, a1 =
1
i
, aj =
i−2+j
i−1+j j = 2, . . . , n− i+ 1 and indeed
0 < {aj} and 0 < x <
∏n−i+1
j=1 aj =
1
n
.
• If all are honest, then Ai winning probability is only bigger than that
(we have −′ instead of −2′ at every multiplicand).
• Number of coin flips = n− 1.
The ith coin flip is P i−1
i
′
,′ , hence by corollary 5, it will haveO
(
log(n

) ·N 
4n
)
rounds.
This proves theorem 2.
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3 Improved protocol
We mentioned in the beginning that if n = 2m, we can do a tournament with
m rounds. In the last try we came up with a protocol of n−1 rounds, because
each time only one couple played a coin flip. The problem with this simple
solution is that it is quite inefficient in terms of number of rounds, and also
almost all the coin flips are unbalanced, which implies an extra factor of at
least log 1

per unbalanced coin flip to the running time. We can improve this
protocol by combining it with the tournament idea.
3.1 Improved protocol for seven players
We will first start by creating an efficient protocol for seven players, before
describing the general solution.
3.1.1 Protocol
1. The following couples play P (balanced coin flip):
A1 − A2, A3 − A4, A5 − A6.
2. The winners of A1 − A2, A3 − A4 play between them P.
The winner of A5 − A6 plays A7 a P 2
3
′
, 
2
. Namely, Pq′, 
2
such that∣∣q′ − 2
3
∣∣ ≤ 
2
.
3. The two winners of last stage play a P 4
7
′
, 
2
.
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3.1.2 Analysis
• If all are honest, then A1 − A4 have the same steps, and they have
winning probability (using similar calculations as before) of at least
1
2
· 1
2
· (4
7
− 
2
) ≥ 1
7
− 1
8
 ≥ 1
7
− .
A5, A6 have a winning probability of at least
1
2
· (2
3
− 
2
) · (3
7
− 
2
) ≥ 1
7
− 1
2

(
3
14
+ 1
3
)
+ 1
8
2 ≥ 1
7
− .
A7 has only two flips, so obviously P7 ≥
(
1
3
− 
2
) · (3
7
− 
2
) ≥ 1
7
− .
• If A1 is honest, he has winning probability of at least
(1
2
− )(1
2
− )(4
7
− ) = 1
7
− 23
28
+ 14
7
2 − 3 ≥ 1
7
−  (since 0 <  < 1).
Same result for A2 − A4.
If A5 (or A6) is honest then he has winning probability of at least
(1
2
− )(2
3
− )(3
7
− ) ≥ 1
7
− 35
42
+ 125
42
2 − 3 ≥ 1
7
− .
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For A7 it is obviously at least
(
1
3
− ) (3
7
− ) ≥ 1
7
− 16
21
 ≥ 1
7
− .
• Number of coin flipping rounds = 3.
• The two unbalanced coin flips will have each O (N 
4
· log 1

)
rounds
according to corollary 5, so the total protocol has running time of
O
(
N 
4
· log 1

)
.
3.2 Final protocol
In the general case we have n parties A1, . . . , An.
Let  > 0. We will show a leader election protocol LE, with log(n) coin
flipping rounds, and a running time of O
(
N 
4
· log n · log 1

)
, s.t. ∀i if party i
is honest, he has winning probability of at least 1
n
− .
3.2.1 Protocol
We will define the protocol recursively.
Let us call it Leader ({A1, . . . , An}, ).
Say it returns the leader selected.
Let k ∈ N s.t. 2k ≤ n < 2k+1.
1. The following are done simultaneously:
• A1, . . . , A2k plays a tournament (of k rounds) among themselves
with P 
2
. Denote the winner as w1.
• w2 = Leader ({A2k+1, . . . , An}, ).
2. w1 plays w2 a P 2k
n
′
, 
2
. Namely, Pq′, 
2
such that
∣∣∣q′ − 2kn ∣∣∣ ≤ 2 .
The winner of this is the leader.
Remark. In contrast to the protocol presented with seven players, here the 2k
first players play P 
2
between themselves. If we had used weak coin flipping
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protocol P, this would give a Leader Election protocol for n players with
bias a bit over  for n = 3, 5. However, this small concession doesn’t increase
our running time.
3.2.2 Analysis
• Assume that all parties are honest. We shall prove by induction the
following:
Claim 8. If all parties are honest, then Pi ≥ 1n − .
Proof. For n = 2 it is obvious. Assume correctness for all m < n, and
we will prove it for n.
Look at A1, . . . , A2k . In the tournament everyone has a 12k winning
chance. Whoever wins, has another coin flip with at least
(
2k
n
− 
2
)
winning chance, so in total they each have at least
1
2k
·
(
2k
n
− 
2
)
= 1
n
− 
2k+1
≥ 1
n
−  winning chance.
From the induction hypothesis, we know that each one of A2k+1, . . . , An
has at least 1
n−2k −  winning chance in the recursive leader election
procedure (to become w2). Notice that 1n−2k is well defined since we can
assume that n is strictly larger than 2k, otherwise we are done. Then
the winner has at least
(
1− 2k
n
− 
2
)
winning chance in the last step, so
altogether he has a winning probability Pi ≥
(
1
n−2k − 
)
·(1− 2k
n
− 
2
) =
1
n
− 
(
1
2
1
n−2k + 1− 2
k
n
)
+ 
2
2
since 2k > n
2
we get that Pi ≥ 1n − 
(
1
2
+ 1− 1
2
)
hence Pi ≥ 1n − .
• We have log(n) coin flipping rounds, and according to corollary (5) we
will have up to O(N 
4
log(1

) log(n)) total rounds.
• The number of unbalanced coin flips is bounded by log(n).
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Claim 9. #unbalanced coin flips = (# of 1’s in the binary representa-
tion of n) - 1.
Proof. This can be proved easily by induction on n:
For n = 1, 2 it is clear. No unbalanced coin flipping protocols are used.
If n is a power of 2, say n = 2k, then it has 0 such.
Else 2k < n < 2k+1, and the first 2k players use again 0 unbalanced coin
flips between them. The remaining m = n − 2k players use (from the
induction hypothesis) the # of 1’s in the binary representation of m,
minus 1, in the appropriate rounds. When joining the two groups, we
again use an unbalanced coin flip (in the last round) which corresponds
to the MSB of n. As n = 2k + m, #1’s in m is exactly one less than
the # of 1s in n, which proves the claim.
Remark. There can only be one unbalanced coin flip per round i, if the
ith bit in the binary representation of n is 1.
• The last thing needed to be proven is that an honest player has a win-
ning probability of 1
n
− .
A simple proof of that will be:
If Ai is honest, then he has a winning probability of at least
log(n)∏
i=1
(ci− ) ≥ 1n − log(n) where the {ci} are the winning probabilities
of Ai in the individual weak coin flipping rounds ( ci < 1 )
Therefore, we can use 
logn
as the weak unbalanced coin flipping bias in
the protocol (instead of 
2
).
Then we finish the proof, but we get running time ofO
(
N 
2 logn
log n log logn

)
instead of O
(
N 
4
log n log 1

)
.
While one might say that log log n factor is insignificant, the difference
between N 
4
and N 
2 logn
might be huge.
In fact, at the moment, the only known proof for existence of weak coin
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flipping with arbitrarily small bias P is analyzed in [ACG+16], giving
a bound of N ≤ 1
O( 1 ) rounds.
Therefore, we will make a more precise calculation, which will allow us
to use our original 
2
in the unbalanced coin flip.
• Let us first do a precise calculation for n = 3:
A1 will play P 
2
with A2, and the winner will play P 2
3
′
, 
2
.
An honest A1 (or A2) will have a winning probability of(
1
2
− 
2
) (
2
3
− ) ≥ 1
3
− 5
6
 ≥ 1
3
− .
The running time of this protocol is O
(
N 
4
· log 1

)
, by corollary (5).
We now prove for n players:
Lemma 10. An honest player Ai has a winning probability which is at least
1
n
− .
Proof. We will prove it by induction on n.
If n = 1, 2, 3, 4 then we saw this is true.
Assume correctness for all n < N , and we shall prove it for n = N .
• We saw this is true if N is a power of 2.
• If N = 2k + 1:
Assume AN is honest. AN only plays one unbalanced coin flip P 2k
N
′
, 
2
,
having winning probability of at least 1
N
−  by corollary (5).
A1, . . . , AN−1 play a full tournament of 2k players, with winning prob-
ability of p ≥ (1
2
− 
2
)k
=
(
1−
2
)k
= (1−)
k
N−1 for an honest player.
By Bernoulli inequality:∀x ≥ −1, n ∈ N (1 + x)n ≥ 1 + nx, plugging
x = −, we get that p ≥ 1−k
N−1 .
Then the honest winner plays P 2k
N
′
, 
2
with AN , hence having winning
probability of at least
1− k
N − 1
(
N − 1
N
− 
)
=
1
N
− 
(
k
N
+
1
N − 1
)
+ 2
NK
N − 1 ≥
1
N
− 
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Where the last inequality is true for every N = 2k + 1 ≥ 3 (because
k = blogNc, and already for k = 1 we get k
N
+ 1
N−1 =
1
3
+ 1
2
< 1).
• Otherwise 2k + 2 ≤ N < 2k+1, for k = blogNc , k ≥ 2.
For all i ≤ 2k by the induction hypothesis (for n = 2k), we have that
the probability for Ai to reach the final weak coin flipping round (round
k + 1) is at least 1
2k
− .
Hence, his winning probability (to be elected) p is at least
p ≥
(
1
2k
− 
)(
2k
N
− 
)
=
1
N
− 
(
2k
N
+
1
2k
)
+ 2
Since 2k + 2 ≤ N < 2 · 2k we get that p > 1
N
− 
(
2k+2
N
)
≥ 1
N
− .
For all i > 2k by the induction hypothesis (for t = N − 2k), we have
that the probability for Ai to reach the final weak coin flipping round
is at least 1
t
− .
Hence, his winning probability (to be elected) is at least(
1
t
− 
)(
t
N
− 
)
≥ 1
N
− 
(
t
N
+
1
t
)
+ 2 ≥ 1
N
− 
(
t
N
+
1
t
)
Since t
N
≤ 1
2
, t ≥ 2 we get that p ≥ 1
N
− .
This completes the proof of theorem 3.
4 Open questions
Here we will present the open question rising from this paper.
• The first obvious open question, is to find a specific family of balanced
weak coin flipping P, hence getting a tighter bound on N.
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• The second open question, which was mentioned before, is to try and
find unbalanced weak coin flipping directly, hence removing theO
(
log 1

)
factor from corollary 5.
• A more specific question is: Can one improve the three party leader
election protocol. Our solution (subsection 3.2) used running time of
O
(
N 
4
· log 1

)
, and the number of rounds in P 
4
might be significantly
greater than in P.
• Can one find a better solution (in terms of running time) to the leader
election problem? Maybe by finding a direct solution to the problem,
and not via weak coin flipping.
• When we needed to use unbalanced weak coin flipping Pq,, we used the
approximate coin flip Pq′, 
2
, which implied two annoying consequences:
– If all players are honest, they are not granted a 1
n
winning proba-
bility, but only 1
n
− 
2
.
Hence the open question is, can one find an arbitrarily small biased
leader election, that guarantees exactly 1
n
winning probability in
the scenario where all players are honest?
– Can one improve corollary 5 to use O
(
Nδ · log 1δ
)
rounds, which
will improve Theorem 3 running time to O
(
N 
2
· log n · log 1

)
?
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Appendix: Weak coin flipping
Let P be a weak coin flipping protocol, with P ∗B the maximal cheating prob-
ability of Bob.
We want to run two instances of P , one after the other (not even at the
same time).
We will define (see [Moc00, ACG+16] for full details) for P :
• Let H = A⊗M⊗B be the Hilbert space of the system.
• | ψ0 >=| ψA,0 >| ψM,0 >| ψB,0 > is the initial state of the system.
• Let there be n (even) stages, i denote the current stage.
• On the odd stages i, Alice will apply a unitary UA,i on A⊗M.
• On the even stages, Bob will apply a unitary UB,i onM⊗B.
• Let | ψi > be the state of the system in the ith stage.
• Let ρA,i = TrM⊗B(| ψi >< ψi |) be the density matrix of Alice in the
ith stage.
• Alice’s initial state (density matrix) is (i)ρA,0 = |ψA,0 >< ψA,0|.
• For even state i we have (ii)ρA,i = ρA,i−1.
• Let ρ˜A,i be the state of A⊗M after Alice gets the ith message.
• For odd i : (iii)ρA,i = TrM(ρ˜A,i), (iv)ρA,i = TrM(UA,iρ˜A,i−1U †A,i).
We know that regardless of Bob’s actions (see [Moc00, ACG+16] for full
proof):
P ∗B ≤ maxTr[ΠA,1ρA,n] (1)
where the maximization is done over all density matrices ρ that satisfies the
conditions (i)− (iv).
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